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iCompete: Analyzing Vendor-Exclusive
Smartphone Tying Arrangements Under
Federal Law
By Andrew Greenhalgh*
I. Introduction
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. 1
Justice Black made this statement in 1958 in reference to
"tying arrangements," a form of vertical restraint in which a seller
coerces consumers by conditioning the sale of a desired product upon
the forced purchase of a second product that consumers might not
want. 2  The statement reflects the century-old view that tying
arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition." Despite this longstanding condemnation under
federal antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act,
4
many tying arrangements are both common and legal today. 5 For
* Andrew Greenhalgh, J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law; B.S., Journalism, News-Editorial Division, 2004, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Communications.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
2 Id. at 5.
3 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §14 (2000).
5 Arik Johnson, Tying Arrangements: Illegal tying is one of the most common
antitrust claims, COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE/COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, available
at http://www.aurorawdc.com/arjcicstyingarrangements.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2008) (allegations of unlawful tying arrangements are common).
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example, a franchisee must agree to purchase any number of goods
dictated by a franchisor in order to purchase a franchise, and users
who wish to listen to music purchased from Apple's iTunes music
store must also purchase an Apple iPod digital audio player.6 While
courts often refer to tying arrangements as "per se" unlawful, the
reality is that such arrangements are only unlawful when the seller,
the product and the market all meet a specific set of conditions that
create unreasonable anticompetitive effects. 7
At present, the cell phone industry does not meet these
requirements. Cellular service providers often subsidize the sale of
expensive handsets when consumers purchase contracts for one or
two years of cellular service. 8  Because the same handsets are
available from other cellular service providers and consumers can
purchase similar plans from competitors, no single cellular service
provider can use a generic cell phone to unreasonably restrain
competition on the market. 9 Moreover, consumers have the option of
buying the average mobile handset without purchasing cellular
service at all. However, the introduction of "smartphones"
complicates things. These smartphones often run proprietary
operating systems and, unlike standard mobile handsets that focus
solely on voice transmission, they have the potential to handle data
transmission, texting, and web browsing better than competitors.'
0
Moreover, certain smartphones are exclusively available from one
cellular service provider and can only be used with the purchase of
cellular service. This sea change in the way the cellular service
industry works has created a potential for unlawful tying
arrangements that did not exist in the industry before 2007.12
6 Apple's AAC audio files will not play on digital audio players offered by the
competitors. However, other music file formats such as MP3s will play on Apple's
iPod. See Apple.com, Itunes: About third-party music players and AAC file
support, http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93032.
7 See infra Parts III-IV (discussing the theory behind unlawful tying
arrangements and the test for such arrangements).
8 See Fred Vogelstein, The Untold Story: How the iPhone Blew Up the
Wireless Industry, WIRED, Jan. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/16-02/ff iphone.
9 See infra Part III.C (distinguishing between lawful and unlawful tying
arrangements).
o See infra Part II.B (discussing smartphone features).
"See infra Part II.B (discussing the iPhone sales arrangement).
12 Whereas cellular service providers dictated the way mobile handsets were
20081
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Whereas federal courts would usually examine unfair competition
practices targeting the cellular service industry under the "Rule of
Reason," a practice that requires an in-depth analysis of the market
and the positive and negative consequences of the tying
arrangement,' 3 these new arrangements dealing with smartphones
may warrant the harsher analysis Justice Black described more than
sixty years ago.
This Comment will focus in particular upon one smartphone
that cannot be used without the purchase of a cellular service
contract. A class action lawsuit in California has targeted Apple, Inc.
because its increasingly popular smartphone, the iPhone, cannot
function at all - either as a phone, a music player, a video player or a
modified personal digital assistant - unless consumers also sign a
two-year cellular service contract with AT&T.14 This lawsuit, filed
under California antitrust law, focuses on the iPhone as a "tying"
product and the cellular service as the "tied product."' 5 However,
because AT&T has an exclusive deal with Apple to sell the iPhone
for five years, the same lawsuit could be filed against AT&T under
federal antitrust law. 16  This Comment addresses whether such an
arrangement between Apple and AT&T could be found unlawful
under the modified per se analysis of tying arrangements.' 7 This
Comment focuses on the iPhone because its business practices, which
were unprecedented in 2007,18 are now being mimicked by
competitors abroad. 19  Under the right circumstances, these
arrangements could grow to impose all of the dangers that Congress
made in the past, new agreements between handset producers have turned the tables
to allow handset makers to dictate terms to the cellular service providers. Mark
Landler, Nokia Pushes to Regain U.S. Sales in Spite of Apple and Google, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/
technology/l0nokia.html (quoting John Tysoe, an analyst for Mobileworld).
13 Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
BYUL. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999).
14 Complaint at 5, Smith v. Apple Inc., No. 1-07-CV-095781 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 2, 2007), available at https://www.appleiphonelawsuit.com/uploads/2007-1 1-
02_Ist Amended Complaint Endorsed.pdf.
15 id.
16 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1961).
17 See infra Part IV (introducing and discussing the modified per se test).
18 Vogelstein, supra note 8, at 1.
19 Landler, supra note 12.
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sought to avoid by outlawing tying arrangements. 20 However, a
careful analysis of the mobile handset market at present reveals that
the deal between AT&T and Apple, while troubling, is not illegal per
se - yet.
Section II provides a general overview of the cellular
21industry. It outlines the common interaction between cellular
service providers and consumers. 22  It also distinguishes between
general mobile handsets and "smartphones" and outlines the specific
retail practices of AT&T and its sales of Apple's iPhone.23 Section
III provides a brief overview of the Sherman Act.24 It then discusses
vertical arrangements in general before specifically describing tying
arrangements. 25 Section III then discusses the economic and legal
theories that justify federal courts' willingness to find these
arrangements per se unlawful when they have sufficient
anticompetitive effects.26 Section IV outlines the specific modified
per se test that the Seventh Circuit employs to examine tying
arrangements. 27 Section V explains why AT&T's arrangement with
Apple, although it constitutes a tying arrangement, is not unlawful
under the modified per se test. 28
20 See infra Part III (discussing antitrust law in general and tying arrangements
in particular).
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 Id.
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 See infra Part III.A (discussing the Sherman Act).
25 See infra Part 111.B (discussing the various tests used with vertical
restraints).
26 See infra Part III.C (discussing leverage theory and the potential
anticompetitive effects of tying).
27 See infra Parts IV.A-D.
28 See infra Parts V.C-D (discussing areas in which the contract passes the per
se test). In the Seventh Circuit, an arrangement that passes the first test is then
examined under the Rule of Reason analysis. Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp.,
450 F.3d 312, 317 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006).
2008]
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II. Overview of the Cellular Service Industry
A. Typical Cellular Service Practices
The cellular service industry generates billions of dollars and
affects billions of consumers worldwide. In 1987, back when clunky
handsets weighed three pounds and cost in excess of three thousand
dollars, just one million subscribers used cell phones worldwide. 29
Today more than 2.4 billion people use cellular services worldwide,
30
and more than 200 million Americans carry a cell phone.3 All told,
the cellular service industry generates more than $11 billion dollars
each year.
32
Globally, most cellular service providers use the Global
System for Mobile Networks, or GSM, technology to transmit voice
and data over a network.33 Different cellular service providers
compete by offering different mobile handsets, different plans,
varying degrees of customer service and varying signal reception by
area. 34 Although consumers have the option of choosing "pay as you
go" cellular service from companies like Virgin Mobile, the majority
of consumers sign a contract with a cellular service provider.
3 5
These contracts lock consumers into using the cellular service
provider's network for a set period of time, typically one or two
years. 36  Each contract offers different terms; the typical contract
provides users with a set number of minutes each month.37 Most
plans also provide unlimited minutes of usage after a certain point in
29 Earthvision Cellular, The Wireless Industry - An Overview of the Cellular
Phone Service in America, http://www.cellularphonenews.com/ebook/
overview.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
30 Cellnumbers.com, Cell Phone Usage Statistics, http://www.cell
numbers.com/cell-phone-usage.aspx (last visited on Apr. 17, 2008).
31 A Better Way to Escape Cell Phone Jail, http://redtape.msnbc.com/
2005/12/a better-way to.html, Dec. 2, 2005 [hereinafter Cell Phone Jail].
32 Vogelstein, supra note 18, at 1.
33 CNET, Pick a Service Provider, CELL PHONE BUYING GUIDE, Aug. 1, 2007,
available at http ://reviews.cnet.com/cell-phone-buying-guide/?tag=tnav
[hereinafter CNET].
34 id.
35 CNET, supra note 33, at Choose A Plan.
36 Id. Two-year contracts are now more common than one-year contracts. Id.
37 Id.
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the evening, typically 7 p.m. or 9 p.m. 38 The price consumers pay
each month depends on how many 'day-time' minutes they get to use
each month, how many data services, such as text messaging, they
use per month, and whatever additional services the contract may
include.
39
When consumers sign a contract with a cellular service
provider, most also purchase a mobile handset from that provider at
the same time. 40 Each handset offers different features - some just
have a numerical keypad while others feature a full "QWERTY"
keypad modeled after a typical computer keyboard.41  Some are
designed for use with e-mail, texting, video, and other features, while
other, cheaper handsets handle nothing but voice calls.42 Once
consumers purchase a cell phone, they typically honor the contract
until it expires, whether or not they are pleased with their cellular
service.43
This loyalty is explained in part by the fact that cellular
service providers often "lock" mobile handsets so that they will not
work with any other cellular service provider's network.44  GSM
handsets operate using a card called a "subscriber identification
module," commonly referred to as a SIM card.45 When consumers
receive a mobile handset as a result of signing a cellular service
contract with providers like T-Mobile or AT&T, the phones come
"locked" so that they cannot accept a SIM card from a competitor.46
Because cellular service providers often greatly subsidize desired
mobile handsets when subscribers sign contracts, most of these
providers justify locking the handsets to their service to prevent
consumers from switching to a different service immediately after
38 id.
39 CNET, supra note 33.
40 id.
41 id.
42 Id.
43 See Cell Phone Jail, supra note 31.
44 Mark Landler, supra note 12.
45 Cellnumbers.com, Unlocked Cell Phone, http://www.cellnumbers.com/
unlocked-cell-phone.aspx [hereinafter Unlocked Cell Phone]. (Last visited April
15, 2008).
46 Id.
2008]
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receiving the discounted cell phone.47  Beyond technological
limitations, cell phone contracts typically impose penalties upon
consumers who wish to cancel their service early.48 Attempting to
switch services can cost consumers hundreds of dollars in penalties;
even then, they can only take their handset with them if their service
provider agrees to "unlock" it so that it will accept a different
provider's SIM card.49
The cellular service industry is just one of many industries
that uses technological measures to "lock in" consumers in a way that
forecloses them from using their products with services offered by
competitors. 50  "Lock-in refers to the amount of difficulty that
consumers face when they try to switch from one product to a
competing product. 5' Companies purposefully make it difficult to
switch from a product, regardless of consumer satisfaction with that
product; for example, cellular service carriers once fought against
allowing users to take their existing telephone number and move it to
another number, and companies like Microsoft still fight against
allowing other companies to access their file formats, which allows
them to lock-in consumers who might otherwise stop using Microsoft
word-processing and spreadsheet products.52 In the cellular service
industry, though, lock-ins have nothing to do with allowing the phone
to function properly; cellular service providers have no obligation to
sell locked phones, and even if they do, they can unlock the phones
by supplying a simple code to consumers.53 Courts examine a firm's
47 id.
48 See Cell Phone Jail, supra note 31.
49 Id. Cellular service providers made more than $2.5 billion from penalties in
the past three years. Id.
50 See Bruce Schneier, With iPhone, "Security" Is Code for "Control",
WIRED, Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/politics/
security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/02/securitymatters_0207.
5 id.
52 Id. ("With enough lock-in, a company can protect its market share even as it
reduces customer service, raises prices, refuses to innovate and otherwise abuses its
customer base.").
53 Cyrus Farivar, Locked vs. Unlocked. Opening Up Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/technology/
personaltech/01 basics.html?ex= 1353819600&en=9904e055336ec 151 &ei=5124&p
artner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
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efforts to lock-in its customers when examining whether an illegal
tying arrangement exists.
54
B. The Rise of "Smartphones" in the Industry
The cellular service industry originally mirrored the landline
telephone industry in that its operations focused on transmitting voice
data across networks. Within the last decade, though, a new series of
devices called "smartphones" have extended the uses of cellular
service and blurred the distinction between mobile handsets and
55
ultraportable personal computers. No standardized definition of a
smartphone exists, but most devices referred to as smartphones run
operating systems, just like personal computers, and all run
applications that go far beyond the transmission of voice over a
56
network. At the very least, these phones combine the features of a
personal digital assistant with the features of a normal telephone.
57
Currently, the smartphone market comprises roughly 5 percent of the
more general cell phone market. 58
In practice, smartphones present a greater danger of lock-in
than regular mobile handsets. Each smartphone typically runs a
single operating system that cannot be replaced.59  Further,
smartphones require two plans: a voice plan for normal calling and a
data plan for checking e-mail and surfing the Internet.60  Certain
smartphones only work with certain data networks. 61 As analysts
14 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476-
77 (1992) (discussing the effects of lock-ins). Lock-ins provide firms with
"leverage" that makes it easier for them to discriminate based on price. Id.
55 Jo Best, Analysis: What is a smartphone?, SILCON.COM, Feb. 13, 2006,
http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39156391,00.htm?r=3.
56 id.
57 See Daniel Eran, Smartphones: iPhone and the Big Fat Mobile Industry,
ROUGHLY DRAFTED, Jan. 21, 2007, http://www.roughlydrafted.com/RD/
RDM.Tech.Q 1.07/BEC05CE 1-D5EB-4E48-B46C-7385D5AADCFE.html.
58 Id.
59 See Miguel Helft, Google Sees Surge in iPhone traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.con/2008/01/14/technology/14apple.html
(discussing the mobile handset industry).
60 See AT&T Wireless, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-
phone-plans/index.jsp (last visited April 15, 2008).
61 AT&T uses the "EDGE" data network but Sprint's mobile network, EV-DO,
provides greater speeds. Kara Rowland, Sprint takes on AT&T, iPhone, WASH.
2008] 445
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predict that the still-developing smartphone industry will grow 33
percent each year through 2012,62 the chances increase that early
"lock-in" for these mobile handsets will directly affect the market
share of the corresponding cellular services, as well as the operating
systems on the handsets, the data networks the handsets use, and the
software that runs on the handsets.
Apple Inc.'s smartphone, the iPhone, exemplifies the
concerns over "lock-in" for two reasons: (1) its unprecedented
exclusivity contract with cellular service provider AT&T, and (2) its
rapid growth in market share since launch. Although cellular service
providers commonly control which phones operate on their networks
by refusing to subsidize and sell certain handsets to consumers,63 this
practice has rarely resulted in exclusivity because competing firms
also sold the same mobile handset. 64  Consumers cannot use the
iPhone with any network other than AT&T because Apple and the
company formerly known as Cingular, long since gobbled up by
AT&T, signed a five-year exclusivity arrangement. Consumers can
purchase the iPhone directly from Apple's brick-and-mortar or online
stores, but the device cannot be used, even to play music or watch
movies or browse the Internet over WiFi, until it has been activated.
The device can only be activated by signing a two-year contract with
66 6AT&T. The company has signed similar deals abroad,67 although
recently a court rendered a similar deal between Apple and T-Mobile
TIMES, April 1, 2008, available at http://washingtontimes.com/apps
/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080402/BUSINESS/469559026/1006.
62 Al Sacco, Mobile Broadband Usage up 157 Percent in 2007, PC WORLD,
Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 143191-
c,mobilebroadband/article.html.
63 Landler, supra note 12.
64 Motorola's popular "Razr" handset, for example, is available for sale from
T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon, Alltel, and Sprint.
65 Vogelstein, supra note 18, at 1.
66 Apple, Inc., Rate Plans for iPhone, http://www.apple.com/iphone/
easysetup/rateplans.html ("Minimum new 2-year wireless service plan and
activation fee required to activate iPhone features, including iPod; plans are subject
to AT&T credit approval.") (Last visited April 15, 2008).
67 Victoria Shannon, IPhone Must Be Offered Without Restrictions, German
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/2l/technology/21 iphone.html?ex= 13533 87600&
en= 10559d8b85e747cb&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
446 [Vol. 20:4
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illegal in Germany. 68 In the United States, the use of third-party
software to unlock the iPhone certainly breaches any consumer's
contract with AT&T and may even violate the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. 69  Other cellular service providers unlock their
phones on certain conditions, but AT&T has announced that it will
not allow users to unlock its phones, 70 raising the question of what
good the device will be to consumers if they want to switch providers
at the end of their two-year contract.
Despite this lock-in effect, the relatively new iPhone has
rapidly gained market share in the American smartphone market.
Although the iPhone has a 6.5 percent market share worldwide,7 ' its
market share in the United States is 28 percent after spending fewer
than two years in the market. 72 The device has also made inroads
into the market for mobile broadband users; its large touch screen
interface works together with Apple's portable version of its Safari
web browser to make it .... the first cell phone browser that promised
something resembling the experience of surfing the Internet on a
PC." 73 This ease of use has manifested itself through a large online
footprint; on December 25, 2007, search engine and web portal
Google received more search requests from the iPhone than from any
other mobile broadband device. The amount of mobile broadband
users is only expected to increase since Apple's announcement that it
had developed a software development kit that will allow third-
parties to port popular business software to the device.75 This rapid
growth, in combination with AT&T's unlocking policy, has already
spurred one lawsuit in California accusing the company of engaging
in an unlawful tying arrangement. 76 The next section explains what a
68 Id.
69 Farivar, supra note 53.
70 Id.
71 Connie Guglielmo, Features Added to iPhone, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2008,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/06/
AR2008030603711 .html.
72 Id.
73 Helft, supra note 59.
74 Id. Today the search requests are second to users running Nokia's Symbian
operating system. Id.
75 Guglielmo, supra note 71.
76 See Smith v. Apple Inc., No. 1-07-CV-095781 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 2,
2008] 447
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tying arrangement is and why federal courts have traditionally
frowned upon them. 7
III. Theory of Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is an express or implied agreement in
which a consumer (a) must purchase Item A in order to purchase Item
B, or (b) agrees not to purchase Items D and E from the competition
as a condition of purchasing Item A. Although these arrangements
are common in many industries, they can violate federal antitrust
laws when they produce sufficient anticompetitive effects. 79  The
first part of this section provides a brief overview of the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act"),80 which provides the basis
for federal regulation of tying arrangements. 8' The second part of
this section discusses the judicial scrutiny of vertical restraints, the
broad subsection of potentially anticompetitive agreements between
firms that can negatively impact consumers. 82 The final part of this
section introduces tying arrangements and distinguishes the
characteristics of lawful tying arrangements and unlawful tying
arrangements.83
A. The Sherman Act
In federal courts, plaintiffs have standing to challenge tying
arrangements under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman
Act").84 The relevant portion of the Sherman Act states: "Every
2007), complaint available at https://www.appleiphonelawsuit.com/uploads/2007-
11-02_1 stAmendedComplaintEndorsed.pdf.
71 See infra Part III.
78 Johnson, supra note 5.
79 Id. (providing an overview of tying arrangements).
80 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
81 See infra Part II.A (discussing the general protection that antitrust laws
provide for consumers).
82 See infra Part III.B (discussing the application of the "rule of reason" to
certain vertical restraints and introducing the categories of vertical restraints that
are "per se" unlawful).
83 See infra Part III.C (distinguishing between "harmless" tying and tying that
has anticompetitive effects).
84 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4 n.1 (1984).
448 [Vol. 20:4
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contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ' 85 The Sherman Act
itself imposes felony penalties on persons or corporations who
engage in prohibited conduct; 86 as a matter of civil law, the Clayton
Act and subsequent provisions grant consumers a right to sue for
violations of the Sherman Act in federal court.87
Although the Sherman Act arose as a response to public
demand for antitrust measures, the general prohibitions of its first
section target the anti-competitive practices commonly associated
with monopolies in any context. 88 The Act grants federal courts the
power to examine a full array of anti-competitive practices ranging
from price measures to backroom deals among supposed
competitors, 89 but its general purpose is to protect consumers by
ensuring fair competition, low prices, and efficient allocation of
resources. 90 As a practical matter, this results in varying levels of
85 15 U.S.C. § 1.
86 Id. (imposing fines up to $1,000,000 for corporations that engage in
anticompetitive practices). For private individuals found guilty of Sherman Act
violations, the penalty can include both the $1,000,000 fine and a prison term not to
exceed ten years. Id.
87 15 U.S.C. § 14; 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) ("any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.") The "Clayton Act" is comprised of
15 U.S.C. § 12-27. As a practical matter, the Clayton Act provides private actors
with an avenue to seek injunctions against anticompetitive practices.
88 See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 15-16 (1980) (noting public demand
prompted Congress to pass a vague, general law ostensibly reflective of existing
common law prohibitions against anticompetitive practices). The general nature of
the Act allowed courts to fashion a policy that preserved lawful competition. Id. at
16.
89 See Murray S. Monroe, Antitrust Symposium. Vertical Restraints, 27 U.
TOL. L. REV. 433, 434 (1996) (discussing an array of restraints on competition that
includes price fixing, exclusive dealing arrangements, reciprocal arrangements and
tie-in agreements).
90 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4 (discussing the theory behind federal antitrust
law). The Sherman Act "rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
2008] 449
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scrutiny targeting a reements between businesses that can negatively
impact consumers.
9
B. Vertical Restraints
Laws against tying arrangements developed as a subset of
laws against the general practice of vertical restraints. In antitrust
terms, a restraint is a limitation that one part% in a transaction
imposes on another party in the transaction. A "horizontal
restraint" arises when parties at the same level attempt to place
limitations upon one another. 93 In contrast, "vertical" restraints occur
when a party at a higher level in the supply chain in the business
transaction imposes a condition upon a party at a lower level of the
supply chain. 94 Vertical restraints typically involve manufacturers
imposing conditions upon retailers who wish to sell the
manufacturer's product and retailers imposing conditions on
consumers who wish to purchase the product through the retailer.95
Although the plain language of the Sherman Act appears to
outlaw all such restraints, 96 the Supreme Court has clarified that the
Sherman Act only applies to "unreasonable" restraints on
competition. 97 When dealing with most allegedly anti-competitive
restraints, the Supreme Court applies a "rule of reason" analysis in
which it examines each restraint's effect on competition on a case-by-
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions." Id.
91 See Monroe, supra note 89, at 434 (discussing restraints involving deals
between manufacturers and distributors and restraints arising from deals between
competitors).
92 Bus. Elec's. Corp. v. Sharp Elec's. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). The
term "restraint" comes from the language of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1
(restraint of trade). The Court recognizes that the general term applies to a host of
activities subject to malleable rules. Bus. Elec's Corp., 485 U.S. at 731-32 (citing
Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889)) (noting that even at common
law the courts refused to hold rules regarding restraints as set in stone).
93 Bus. Elec's Corp., 485 U.S. at 729-30 (distinguishing between horizontal,
vertical, and "naked" restraints).
94 Monroe, supra note 89, at 434.
95 Id.
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (applying to any contract "in restraint of trade" without
qualification).
97 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
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case basis. However, when the Court identifies a "manifestly anti-
competitive" restraint, it applies a per se approach in which it holds
the restraint unlawful even if the firm has an arguably valid
justification for imposing the restraint. 99
For example, competitors that control a substantial amount of
trade in Item A engage in per se unlawful activity when they
intentionally exchange pricing information in order to fix prices for
Item A at a certain level, even if the competitors settle on a price that
consumers find reasonable.' 00  In 2004, the federal government
obtained guilty pleas from competitors in the electronics industry
who conspired to fix the prices of DRAM, a variety of random-access
memory widely used in computer systems, and secured fines of
$250,000 and prison terms ranging from four to six months for
executives involved. 0 1 When faced with instances of horizontal
restraint, federal courts find price-fixing per se unlawful regardless of
whether the competitors collude to fix maximum, minimum or
uniform prices because they almost always inhibit competition by
deterring or stifling entry into the market, and providing the same
reward to all competitors regardless of their superior skill, training, or
willingness to innovate. 102
In contrast, the Court applies the "rule of reason" to vertical
restraint scenarios in which a manufacturer requires retailers to sell
its product at a set minimum price. 103 Unlike horizontal price fixing,
98 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (citing
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911)).
99 Bus. Elec's Corp., 485 U.S. at 723 (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-290 (1985)). Manifestly
anticompetitive restrictions are those that, on their face, "always or almost always
tend to restrict competition or decrease output." Id.
'00 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927). In a
decision that the Court has not deviated from in regard to horizontal restraints, the
Court stated that "[t]he power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not,
involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow." Id. at 397.
101 Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Four Infineon
Technology Executives Agree to Plead Guilty in International DRAM Price-Fixing
Conspiracy (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
pressreleases/2004/206631 .htm.
102 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med'l Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346-48 (1982).
103 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720
(2007) (overturning century-old precedent holding such restrains as per se
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these manufacturer-suggested retail prices, which could now become
manufacturer-required retail prices (1) help stimulate competition
between manufacturers by stifling price-competition between
retailers, (2) induce retailers into investing in alternative, less-
expensive variants of the manufacturer's product, and (3) rewards
retailers that expend money on providing high-quality service in
selling the manufacturer's product over retailers that provide inferior
service in order to sell the manufacturer's product at a cut rate.'
0 4
When firms create vertical restraints that have these pro-competitive
benefits, the courts almost always find them lawful.' 5 As such, the
courts typically uphold vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing,
exclusive appointments and refusals to deal because they are not
"manifestly anti-competitive. ' ' 06 In contrast, tying arrangements are
a form of vertical restraint that exists in a limbo somewhere between
the rule of reason and per se unlawfulness.' 
07
C. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is an arrangement in which consumers
must agree to purchase Item B in order to buy Item A. 108 When
examining tying arrangements, courts refer to the item that
consumers actually wish to purchase as the "tying product."' 1 9 In a
tying arrangement, consumers cannot purchase the tying product
unless they purchase the "tied product" as well." 0 The first part of
this section discusses the reasons why courts render many tying
arrangements unlawful."'1 The second part of this section
unlawful).
104 Id. at 2715-16.
105 W. Power Sports, Inc. v. Polaris Indus. Partners, 744 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D.
Idaho 1990) ("No cases have been found that have awarded the plaintiff a victory
after a 'rule of reason' analysis.").
106 See Monroe, supra note 89, at 434.
107 See infra Part III.C (discussing the rules and policy relating to tying
arrangements).
108 See Johnson, supra note 5.
109 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 321 (4th ed. 2005).
110 Id
... See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing the alleged anticompetitive effects of tying
arrangements).
[Vol. 20:4
Smartphone Tying Arrangements
distinguishes the characteristics of a lawful tying arrangement and an
unlawful tying arrangement. 
112
1. The Anticompetitive Effects of Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements have been criticized on several grounds.
First, they unfairly coerce consumers into buying a product that they
might not want.' Second, they impair competition based on the
merits of a product b yreventing competitors from competing based
on product quality.' Third, tying arrangements "foreclose"
competition in the sale of the tied product imposing hurdles on
market entry that have nothing to do with quality, strategy, price, or
any of the other hallmarks of a competitive market. 1 5 This section
addresses each of the arguments in turn.
a. Consumer Coercion
When retailers impose tying arrangements upon consumers,
they use consumer demand for one product as leverage to coerce
consumers into purchasing another product that consumers might not
even want.116 By coercing consumers through a tying arrangement, a
competitor arguably violates public policy by impinging on the
"freedom of choice" inherent in an open market. 7  Despite its
inherent unfairness to consumers, this argument against tying carries
little weight because antitrust law focuses on competition, not
consumers.
If consumers had no intention of purchasing the second
product at all, the tying arrangement merely harms consumer
112 See infra Part III.C.2 (distinguishing between common tying arrangements
that consumers encounter and unlawful tying arrangements that the courts have
struck down).
113 Alan Devlin, Comment, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product
Tying, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 521, 523 (2007).
114 See infra Part III.C. 1.b (discussing choices that prevent other competitors
from competing by providing a higher-quality product).
... See infra Part III.C. 1.c (discussing the concept of foreclosure as it applies to
the Supreme Court's tying arrangement jurisprudence).
116 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 12.
117 See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed be
the Tie? ", 4 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 1, 28-29 (1991) (comparing the consumer choice
argument to the "foreclosure" argument).
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pocketbooks; the Sherman Act, however, concerns itself with
"restraints on trade." 118  When retailers coerce consumers into
purchasing an item that they would not otherwise buy, no restraint on
competition occurs with regard to consumers; if consumers have no
reason to purchase the tied product from anyone else for any reason,
no competition among consumers actually existed for that
consumer's business in the tied product's market. 1 9 Instead, the
tying arrangement has the same effect on competition that it would
have if no other competitors existed for that tied product. 
20
b. Meritless Competition
When federal courts address consumer coercion, they do so
from the perspective of the competition: when firms create tying
arrangements, they force consumers to purchase the tied product
based on their desire for an item in another market, the market for the
tying product, rather than on the merits of the market for the tied
product. 12 1  Whereas one would expect consumers to reward a
competitor's efforts by gravitating toward a product of a higher
quality in a competitive market, a tying arrangement removes quality
from the equation and allows a competitor to push an inferior product
upon consumers. 122
Even when a tying firm produces a quality product, a tying
arrangement can still offend merit-based competition because it
"' 15 U.S.C. § 1.
119 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 16.
"[W]hen a purchaser is "forced" to buy a product he would not have otherwise
bought even from another seller in the tied product market, there can be no adverse
impact on competition because no portion of the market which would otherwise
have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed." Id.
120 See Reifert, 450 F.3d at 318 (noting that without competitors, a tying
arrangement has no effect on competition at all).
121 Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
"By conditioning [the] sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a
seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied'
product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market."
Id.
122 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2., 466 U.S. at 14 (discussing the
anticompetitive effects that result when sellers use market power "to impair
competition on the merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be
insulated from competitive pressures").
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prevents consumers from choosing a product of equal quality from
the firm's competitor. 123  The Supreme Court encountered this
situation in one of its earliest cases involving the tying of a patented
product to a product that cannot be patented. In International Salt
Co. v. United States, International Salt refused to sell its patented
"Lixator" and "Saltomat" devices unless purchasers agreed not to
purchase salt from any other company. 125 Although the two patented
devices used ordinary salt available from many of International Salt's
competitors, the company argued that the tying agreement benefited
consumers because the contracts ensured that consumers would use
salt of a certain quality, which in turn would ensure that the machines
stayed in proper working order. 126  Furthermore, the company
already sold its salt at competitive market prices. 1
27
The Supreme Court refused to entertain the argument because
International Salt failed to show that other competitors could not
produce and sell salt of a quality equal to International Salt's
product.128 Although the tying arrangement did not harm consumers
directly because it provided for competitive rates on the sale of its
salt, 129 the arrangement had a "stifling effect" that harmed
International Salt's competitors because it forced them to "undercut"
their prices to compete effectively. 1
30
c. Foreclosure
In a way, the removal of merit from competition is just one
aspect of a larger problem created by tying arrangements:
foreclosure. When a firm "forecloses" the market for a product, it
effectively denies other firms the ability to compete in that market. 131
123 See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947) (criticizing a
salt company for tying its patented salt machines to the purchase of its unpatented
salt products).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 394-95.
126 Id. at 397.
127 Burchfiel, supra note 117, at 35-36.
128 Id. at 36.
129 Id.
130 Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 397.
131 See Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969).
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Such foreclosures often occur legally when a firm operates so well, or
maintains the ability to offer prices so low, that other competitors
cannot compete profitably.' By that same token, another
competitor can legally, though not sensibly, foreclose competitors
from entering the market by opting to sell the product at a loss.133
The Supreme Court's long-standing difficulty with certain tying
arrangements, however, stems from the idea that it is anticompetitive
for a firm to foreclose competitors in one market by using the power
it developed in the market for another product.' 
34
In Fortner v. U.S. Steel, the idea of foreclosure especially
troubled the Court because of the barriers on entry that such tying
arrangements imposed on firms wishing to enter the market. Beyond
creating a quality product at a competitive price, any firm wishing to
enter the market had the additional burden of overcoming the
"attraction of the tying product itself."' 135 Such an arrangement can
burden firms by requiring them to enter into two markets at once, a
practice that imposes significantly greater expense than entry into a
single market.'1-6 Such ties also decrease the likelihood that new
firms will want to enter the market because, by binding a substantial
proportion of potential consumers through the sale of a product in a
different market, the tying firm has significantly drained the pool of
prospective customers.1
3 7
2. Lawful vs. Unlawful Tying Arrangements
Although the many anticompetitive theories associated with
tying arrangements forecast doom and gloom for the practice, tying
arrangements are actually quite common. 138 These arrangements are
132 Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine After Fortner v. US. Steel,
79 YALE L.J. 86, 92 (1969).
133 Id.
114 Id. at 86.
135 Fortner Enter., 394 U.S. at 513.
136 Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2247,
2261-62 (2007).
137 Kurt A. Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY
L.J. 253, 268-69 (1985) (noting that this can thin a market to the point where it
ceases to function competitively).
138 See Johnson, supra note 5.
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common because they are not inherently unlawful. 139 Instead, they
are only unlawful when they are likely to, or actually do, produce
these anticompetitive effects. 140  Under the modified per se test
developed by the Supreme Court, the tying arrangement must meet a
set of demanding criteria before the Court determines that it is likely
to be anticompetitive and therefore unlawful. 141 When the
arrangement meets those criteria, it must be halted because it has the
potential to become "one of the greatest agencies and
instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man."'
' 42
But when a tying arrangement does not meet those criteria, it
fails to produce sufficient anticompetitive effects and is therefore
considered harmless. Justice Black set out much-used example of
harmless tying in 1958 when he discussed a tying arrangement in
which a grocery store refused to sell flour unless customers also
purchased sugar as well.143 If a dozen other grocery stores exist in
the area, and each is willing to sell sugar and flour separately, then
the tying arrangement has no anticompetitive effects. Similarly, if
the tying grocery store offers sugar and flour separately as well, but
provides a discount when consumers purchase them together, the tie
has no anticompetitive effects. In this situation, the tied items are
fungible, not unique, and the arrangement neither forecloses the flour
or sugar markets to new competitors nor provides the tying grocery
store with an edge in the flour business based on its power in the
sugar market. In such a situation, the tie is lawful because it "would
hardly tend to restrain competition."' 44 Today, such harmless ties are
abundant in commerce.' 45 The next section discusses the Supreme
139 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 22 n.34 (noting that the
Sherman Act prohibits restraints on trade, not tying arrangements). A tying
arrangement is not automatically a restraint on trade.
140 Id. (illegality depends on anticompetitive effects, not the fact that the sale of
one product is conditioned on the sale of another).
141 See infra Part IV (discussing the test for per se unlawfulness).
142 H.R.REP. No 63-627, at 13 (1914), reprinted in 2 THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 1094 (Earl
W. Kintner ed., 1978).
143 N. PaC. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 7.
144 Id.
145 Linda Greenhouse, Antitrust Bar to 'Tying' of Sales Eased By Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1984, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res =
980DEEDD 1 E39F93BA 15750COA962948260&sec=health&spon=&pagewanted =
all (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish).
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Court's jurisprudence regarding the rarer creature, the tie that creates
sufficient anticompetitive effects to be rendered unlawful no matter
what justification a firm might have for it.' 46
IV. Law of the Tie
Although tying arrangements abound in today's marketplace,
some of these arrangements have characteristics that make them so
unreasonable and so anticompetitive that federal courts deem them
unlawful. Most federal courts employ a "rule of reason" analysis to
most vertical restraints to determine whether a firm's anticompetitive
behavior outweighs any pro-competitive justifications for that
behavior. 147  In a rule of reason analysis, courts first require the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions are actually causing
detrimental, anticompetitive effects. 14 8  The defendant then has a
chance to prove that the practice actually benefits competition more
than it harms competition. 149 If the defendant succeeds, the plaintiff
has one last chance to prevail by showing that the defendant could
achieve the same result with "less restrictive alternatives." 150 Under
this analysis, the defendant usually wins. 151
In the case of tying arrangements, courts first employ a
"modified per se" or "quasi per se" analysis.152 In a normal "per se"
analysis, merely proving the existence of a tying arrangement would
render it unlawful; instead, the "modified" approach requires a
defendant to prove several factors regarding the defendant's market
power and the potential effects of the tying arrangement." 3 The
modified per se approach departs from the traditional rule of reason
at this point; 154 once the plaintiff has proven these elements, the
146 See infra Part IV (discussing the steps in the per se test).
147 Monroe, supra note 89, at 436.
148 Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REv. 77, 79 (2003).
149 Id.
15o Id. at 79-80.
151 See Monroe, supra note 89, at 436 n. 17.
152 Devlin, supra note 113, at 529.
153 Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust
as History, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1051-53 (1985).
154 See Monroe, supra note 89, at 441 (noting that the analysis mirrors the rule
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defendant cannot argue that the tying arrangement actually does not
have anticompetitive effects or that it has pro-competitive effects that
outweigh any anticompetitive effects. 13 5  Instead, these tying
arrangements pose such an "unacceptable risk of stifling
competition" that federal courts do not charge the plaintiff with
making an expensive, burdensome inquiry into actual market
effects. 56
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court's
modified per se approach to require proof of the following elements
before deeming a tying arrangement unlawful: (1) a tying
arrangement must exist between two distinct products, 57 (2) the
defendant must have "sufficient economic power in the tying market
to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product,"15 8 (3) the arrangement must affect a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce, 159 and (4) the tying company must
have an economic interest in the sales of the tied seller.' 60 The fourth
prong of the analysis is satisfied whenever the tying firm gains some161
economic benefit from the sale of the tied product. This section
will explain the remaining requirements in turn.
A. When Does a Tying Arrangement Exist Between Two
Distinct Products?
To prove a claim of a per se unlawful tying arrangement in
the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff must first show that a tying
arrangement exists between two distinct products. 162 This threshold
question actually involves two separate questions: (1) whether the
of reason until the elements have been established).
155 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
156 Id. at 9, 16 n.25.
' Reifert, 450 F.3d at 316.
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing Moore v. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 1977)).
160 Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir.
1978).
161 Id.
162 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 316.
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sale actually involves two products' 63 and (2) whether those
products are actually "tied" by the sale. f64
While the question of whether two distinct products exist
appears to be a "bright line" question, the distinction between Item A
and Item B is not always obvious. If, for example, a merchant
refused to sell a toaster oven to a consumer unless the consumer also
purchased a compact disc, no one would question that the merchant
tied two distinct products together. By the same token, courts would
not recognize a tying arrangement in the shoe industry just because
merchants refuse to sell a left shoe and a right shoe separately.
However, the question becomes murkier when courts must decide
whether anesthetic services are distinct products in relation to other
services a hospital offers during the same surgery, 165 or whether an
agreement to provide parts and service is a distinct product tied to the
sale of photographic equipment. 
166
To answer the question, federal courts focus on the nature of
the market in which the products are sold. 167 Whether a packaged
sale is one product or two or more distinct products depends on the
nature of the demand in a particular market, not the way the products
function together. 68 Even if Item B cannot function without Item A
the two items can constitute distinct products in antitrust analysis.
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the
Supreme Court noted that computers and software, cars and tires and
cameras and film could all be distinct products even though one
product had little use without the other. 170  The true question is
163 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462.
164 Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708 (7th Cir.
1977).
165 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 8.
166 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462-63.
167 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 17.
168 Id. at 19.
169 See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (ice cream
packaging transports and coolant); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S.
661, 667 (1944) (in which the sale of a heating system and a "stoker switch" for
that heating system constituted an unlawful tying arrangement).
170 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 463.
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whether sufficient consumer demand exists to make it efficient for a
firm to sell the two products separately. 171
The answer also depends on whether consumes normally have
the option to purchase the products separately or would at least
expect to be able to make the purchases separately. 7 2 In Eastman
Kodak, the Court found that equipment and a service plan for that
equipment were two separate products because consumers also had
the option to purchase parts and service plans from independent
service organizations. 173 Likewise, in Jefferson Parish, the Court
found that anesthesia services were a distinct product from the rest of
the services a hospital offered with its surgeries because patients
ordinarily had the option of hiring their own anesthetist.' 74  So
although Item A might be necessary to use Item B, the products can
still be distinct.
After finding that the sale involves two distinct products, a
federal court must next determine that the seller actually "tied" the
products together. 175 For the court to make this determination the
plaintiff must provide evidence of an agreement between the seller
and the buyer in which the buyer agrees to purchase Item B in
exchange for the ability to purchase item A. 17 6  However, this
agreement may be either express or implied.'7 7 Even if a contract
does not contain a specific clause requiring the purchaser to perform
an action or to refrain from performing an action, the agreement can
exist when the terms of the contract have the practical effect of
foreclosing the purchaser from performing or failing to perform that
action. 178 As such, the question of whether Item A can function
without Item B comes into play in this part of the analysis rather than
the analysis of whether the two items constitute distinct products or a
single functional package. Whether express or implied, a tie exists
' Id. at 462.
172 Id. at 463; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 23.
113 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462-63.
174 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 23.
175 Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 567 F.2d at 708.
176 Id.
177 See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 326.
178 Id.
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when the seller effectively coerces a buyer into purchasing the two
distinct products. 
179
B. When Does a Seller Exercise Sufficient Economic Power
To Appreciably Restrain Free Competition in The Tied
Market?
Once the Seventh Circuit has established that a tying
arrangement exists, the court must begin its inquiry into whether the
arrangement is anticompetitive. 180 The Seventh Circuit poses the
question as whether the seller has "sufficient economic power in the
tying market to appreciably restrain free competition in the market
for the tied product."' 8' 1 This inquiry departs from the typical "rule of
reason" analysis because it searches for the "potential" for
anticompetitive effects, not proof that those effects exist. 182 As such,
the inquiry breaks down into two questions examining the likelihood
of anticompetitive conduct based on the characteristics of the
business entity and the market in which it operates. 183 To determine
whether this likelihood exists, the Seventh Circuit must first ask
whether the tying firm has "sufficient economic power," commonly
referred to as market power.184
If the first step of the Seventh Circuit's inquiry answers the
question of whether a tying arrangement exists, the second step
begins to answer the question: "so what?"' 185  Recall that in the
example of the sale of flour tied to the sale of sugar, the tying
arrangement had no anticompetitive effects in part because the grocer
179 Times-Picayune Publ'g Co., 345 U.S. at 614
180 See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6 ("Of course where the seller has no
control or dominance over the tying product so that it does not represent an
effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be insignificant at most.").
181 Id.
182 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 16.
183 See id at 16 n.25 (discussing the reasons why courts forego burdensome
examinations of actual market effects in tying arrangement cases).
"' Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
185 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 25 (noting that
packaged sales themselves are not inherently anticompetitive). A court must
examine the effects of the tying arrangement to make that determination. Id.
(indicating that an element of coercion must be present).
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had no power to force consumers to purchase the tied products.' 86
The question of whether a firm has market power can accurately be
characterized as whether the firm has "leverage" to coerce consumers
into making a purchase that they would not normally make in a
competitive market. 87 More recently, the Supreme Court has posed
the question of whether a single seller has the power to raise price
and restrict output, actions that would normally have an unfavorable
impact on sales in a competitive market.' 
88
The Supreme Court, focusing on the realities of the market in
question, 89 has formulated several different tests to determine
whether a tying firm has sufficient market power. The Court infers
that a firm has sufficient economic power when the firm controls a
significant share of the market. 190 Even if the firm does not control
enough market share under the first test, the firm may still have
sufficient leverage if the firm offers a unique product that competitors
cannot offer. 191
1. Defining "Sufficient Economic Power" Through Market
Share
Although federal courts use market share, they have not set a
minimum amount of market share that a tying firm must control to
have sufficient economic power. The Supreme Court has made clear
that a tying firm does not need to control a monopoly in the tied
market. 92 However, the Court has referred to the requisite market
186 See supra Part II.C.2
187 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 14 n.20 ; Roger D. Blair
& Jeffrey Finci, The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An
Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 536-37 (1983).
188 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
189 Id. at 467.
'90 Id. at 464.
'9' Fortner Enter., Inc., 394 U.S. at 505.
192 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 11.
"While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion which speaks of
'monopoly power' or 'dominance' over the tying product as a necessary precondition
for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements, we do
not construe this general language as requiring anything more than sufficient
economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied
product.") Id.
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share as a "predominant" share of the market.' 93  This analysis
presented no problems in International Salt because the tying firm
was the largest producer of salt in the country.' 94 The dominance
may also occur locally. In Reifert, the Seventh Circuit found
sufficient economic power in a real estate association that controlled
access to a marketed property list essential to individual realtors in
the area.195  In Jefferson Parish, in contrast, a hospital servicing
thirty percent of the population of Jefferson Parish in Louisiana failed
to have sufficient market share; 196 for the Court, the fact that seventy
percent of residents obtained their medical services elsewhere
showed that the hospital lacked the market power to coerce
consumers into accepting its tying arrangement.'
97
Beyond market share, previous Supreme Court cases suggest
that the volume of sales a firm makes can also allow a court to
conclude that the firm has sufficient economic power. In
International Salt, the Court cited the large volume of business
conducted by the defendant as one justification for applying a per se
rule to its tying arrangement. 198 In Northern Pacific Railroad, the
Court applied the per se test to a railroad company because the
company engaged in large number of separate tying arrangements
involving millions of acres of land. 199 A reliance on sales volume
also explains the Court's seemingly anomalous conclusion in United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, in which a credit firm
'" Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
194 See Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 394 (criticizing a salt company for tying its
patented salt machines to the purchase of its unpatented salt products).
"' Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317.
196 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 26-27.
197 Id; but see Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 672
(7th Cir. 1985) (noting that federal vertical restraint guidelines treated tying
arrangements involving less than 30% market share as acceptable).
198 Int'l Salt Co,. 332 U.S. at 396 ("The volume of business affected by these
contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the
arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious.").
'99 N. Pac. Ry. Co, 356 U.S. at 7-8 ("The very existence of this host of tying
arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at least
where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the existence of these
restraints.").
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owned by one of the world's largest corporations was found to not
have sufficient market share to justify aper se analysis. 200
2. Defining "Sufficient Economic Power" Through Unique,
Desirable Products
Federal courts also infer market power from a firm's ability to
offer a unique product that its competitors are unable, rather than
unwilling, to offer. 20 1  The modem "unique product" approach
combines the elements of two distinct indicators of market power that
the Supreme Court focused on in the past: a firm's control over a
product that people desire,20 2 and a firm's control over patented
products, copyrighted materials, or products that the firm's
competitors could not otherwise offer. 20 3 Although recent Supreme
Court decisions have reduced the importance of the existence of
patents in tying products, 204 it is unclear what effect this has had on
the unique product approach as a whole.
The Supreme Court demonstrated the "desirability" factor in a
number of cases involving film distribution.20 5 In United States v.
Loew's, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a tying arrangement in
which a movie studio refused to grant television networks licenses to
air its more popular films unless the networks also agreed to license
less popular films. 20 6 Without referencing the theater chain's market
share, the Court concluded that it could infer market power through, 207
Loew's control over products that consumers desired. The Court's
willingness to find that such an arrangement constituted an unlawful
tie stems from the theory that the popularity of one product, a
200 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 611 (1977).
201 See Blair & Finci, supra note 187, at 541-44.
202 Id. at 541.
203 U.S. Steel Corp., 429 U.S. at 621-22.
204 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
205 Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 131; Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 38.
206 Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 48.
207 Id. at 45 ("Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial
economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers
or from uniqueness in its attributes.").
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successful film, should not be used as leverage to give a competitive
advantage to a distinct, inferior product.
2 0 8
But desirability alone is not enough to show sufficient
economic power; consumers desire sugar, but a tying arrangement
between sugar and flour means nothing if other grocery stores can
provide what consumers desire. Beyond being desirable, the tying
product must be unique in that other firms cannot offer it. 20 9  The
Supreme Court insists on inability, not unwillingness. In United
States Steel Corporation v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., the Court
dismissed an argument that a credit corporation offered a unique loan
package because the corporation merely provided financing terms
that other corporations were unwilling to give, not unable to give.
2 10
In contrast, the successful movies tied to inferior movies in Loew's fit
the definition of unique products because they are not fungible and
other movie companies cannot provide a functional equivalent of the
product; 211 for example, a television network seeking to license
Casablanca would not settle for an "equivalent" movie about a
doomed romance set in Marrakech.
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court held that a patent
conferred a "virtual monopoly" sufficient to presume that the firm
holding the patent had sufficient economic power in a tying
arrangement. 2 2 Earlier Courts felt that tying firms tied unpatented
goods to patented goods as a means of extending the firm's virtual
monopoly on the patented item in a manner inconsistent with patent
law.2 13 Under this theory, a tying firm misused the rights granted to
208 See Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 158 ("[T]he requirements that all
be taken if one is desired increases the market for some. Each stands not on its own
footing but in whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have.").
209 Fortner Enter., Inc., 394 U.S. at 505 n.2 ("Uniqueness confers economic
power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the
distinctive product themselves."); see also Blair & Finci, supra note 187, at 287.
210 U.S. Steel Corp., 429 U.S. at 621-22.
211 See Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 48 (holding that a movie studio had a
monopoly over the sale of each of its feature films because each film "was unique
in itself' and "varied in audience appeal" and was not "fungible," meaning non-
interchangeable). This would allow a movie studio to "forc[e] a television station
which wants "Gone With The Wind" to take "Getting Gertie's Garter" as well is
taking undue advantage of the fact that to television as well as motion picture
viewers there is but one "Gone With The Wind." Id. at 48 n.6.
212 Illinois Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 33-34 (discussing federal precedent).
213 Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 46.
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it for innovating in one market in order to monopolize sales in a
market in which the firm did not innovate. 2 14 In 2006, the Court
expressly held that the presence of a patent by itself is no longer
proof of sufficient economic power. 215  Although previous patent
cases refused to consider whether competitors offered products that
could perform the equivalent of the patented, tying product,2 16 it now
appears that the availability of alternatives plays a role in determining
whether the unique nature of a product confers sufficient economic
power under the per se analysis.
C. When Does the Arrangement Have the Potential to Affect
a "Not Insubstantial" Amount of Commerce?
After determining that a firm with sufficient economic power
has imposed a tying arrangement on consumers, the court must then
determine whether this action has the potential to impact a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce. 2 17 First, courts must establish
the exact type of commerce - goods, merchandise, service, or some
variant - affected by the tying arrangement. Then, the court must
define the market area - local, national, or global - in which the
seller operates.219 Finally, courts determine whether the arrangement
has the potential to foreclose a substantial volume of commerce in
that market. 220
"Since one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness, the
principle of these cases was carried over into antitrust law on the theory that the
existence of a valid patent on the tying product, without more, establishes a
distinctiveness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involving the
patented product would have anticompetitive consequences." Id.
214 Id.
215 Illinois Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 42-43.
216 Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 398.
217 Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and
Antitrust's Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1816 (1999). At
one point the courts interpreted the Sherman Act as dealing with substantial dollar
volume and the Clayton Act as dealing with substantial impact on competition. Id.
The two have since merged. Id. at 1815-16 (arguing that courts have impermissibly
used the Sherman Act to address arrangements reserved for the Clayton Act).
218 Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 327.
219 Id.
220 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 16.
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The Seventh Circuit reframes the first two questions by
asking whether there is more than one competitor in the relevant
market in which the tying arrangement exists. 22' For goods and
services, the Seventh Circuit determines whether they are part of the
same market by asking whether the goods and services are "good
substitutes" for one another.222 The products are good substitutes
when they are reasonably interchangeable.223 In the Seventh Circuit,
plaintiffs must present economic evidence proving that the goods are
reasonably interchangeable.224 The provisions of actual data and
reasonable analysis are necessary because the Seventh Circuit is
unwilling to accept that products appearing to be reasonable
substitutes to the naked eye are actually reasonable substitutes.
225
After defining the relevant market, courts look to whether more than
one competitor exists for that market. In this arena, the Seventh
Circuit requires more than superficial similarities. In Reifert, the
Seventh Circuit found that a local real estate marketers' association
had no competition in its relevant market even though more than a
226dozen similar associations existed. Those organizations dealt with
a narrower aspect of the real estate market or only opened themselves
up to members of certain nationalities, thus disqualifying them as
competitors in the same market. 2 7
Once plaintiffs have proven that the tying firm has at least one
competitor in the relevant market, the Seventh Circuit then
determines whether the firm has the potential to affect a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce. Courts often make this
determination based on the volume of sales the tying firm
generates. 22 8 The question is whether the sales are significant, with
the requisite dollar amount varying from court to court, or whether
the volume of sales is de minimus.229  This method fits with the
221 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 318.
222 Id.
223 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
224 Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d. 661, 664 (7th
Cir. 2004).
225 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 318.
226 Id. at 318-19.
227 Id. at 319-20.
228 Johnson, supra note 5, at Basic Requirements.
229 Id.
468 [Vol. 20:4
Smartphone Tying Arrangements
concept of a "modified per se" approach because it merely examines
the amount of sales rather than making a burdensome inquiry into the
actual effect of those sales on the market. 230 Most Supreme Court
decisions reference the volume of commerce with regard to the
amount of commerce the in which the tying firm is engaged.23'
Court decisions also reference the volume of commerce that the tying
arrangement would affect. In IBM v. United States, the Supreme
Court invalidated a tying arrangement between early computers and
punch card sales based in part on the volume of commerce in which
IBM's competitors engaged.232 IBM's tying arrangement stood to
affect nineteen percent of the punch card market, meaning that it
would affect the sales of 600,000,000 punch cards.2 3
V. Has AT&T Created a Per Se Unlawful Tying
Arrangement in the Smartphone Market?
A tying arrangement involving typical mobile handsets is
neither unreasonable nor illegal. For most mobile handsets, a cellular
service provider's attempted coercion is nothing more than a grocer's
insistence that customers purchase a bag of flour if they want to buy a
bag of sugar.2 34 Because consumers can look elsewhere to acquire
the exact same tying product, the cell phone, and an equivalent tied
product, the cellular service, a tying firm lacks leverage. 235 The
question becomes closer with smartphones, and the iPhone in
particular because many smartphones are unique and unavailable
elsewhere. However, upon applying the Seventh Circuit's version of
the modified per se test, it becomes clear that even these exclusivity
arrangements are not unlawful because AT&T lacks sufficient
economic power in the smartphone market and probably cannot
affect a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce.236
230 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2, 466 U.S. at 16 n.25 (discussing the
justification of the per se approach).
231 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462.
232 Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135-36 (1936).
233 Id. at 136.
234 See supra notes 143 - 146 and accompanying text (discussing the sugar
example).
235 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at, 11-12 (discussing
leverage theory).
236 See infra Part V.C-D (outlining why AT&T lacks sufficient economic
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A. AT&T Has Tied the Sales of the iPhone to Sales of Its
Cellular Service.
AT&T's exclusivity contract affirmatively answers the
Seventh Circuit's threshold question of whether a tying arrangement
exists between two distinct products.237 Rather than requiring that
the products be sold as two parts of one functional package, the
market allows cellular service and mobile handsets to be sold
separately. 238 While it is true that many consumers purchase their
phones in conjunction with a cellular service contract, 239 most
providers also sell mobile handsets independently. 240 The iPhone
itself is available for sale in Apple stores and online without signing a
contract with AT&T. 24 1  Furthermore, Nokia, Sony-Ericsson,
Motorola, RIM, and other makers of mobile handsets are not cellular
service providers; the market allows the products to be sold
separately. A mobile handset cannot perform voice calls, text
messaging, web browsing, or any of its traditional functions without
cellular service, but two products can be distinct even if one cannot
function without the other. 242 Just as hospital patients are
accustomed to having the option of brining in their own
anesthesiologist if they are not happy with the one that the hospital
offers, 243 consumers are accustomed to using their own mobilehandset if they are not happy with the products offered by a cellular
power and cannot affect a substantial amount of commerce).
237 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462 (discussing whether two products
exist).
238 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 17 (product analysis
focuses on the market and demand).
239 See Farivar, supra note 53 (discussing the cellular service industry).
240 In-store sales and online stores typically set out the price for the phone
itself, followed by the discounted price consumers receive when they purchase the
phone in conjunction with a contract. Alternatively, electronics retailers like Best
Buy sell mobile handsets independently. See Best Buy Inc.'s online store,
http://www.bestbuy.com/site//olspage.j sp?id=pcmcat 146100050026&type=categor
y (last visited April 14, 2008).
241 See Apple, Inc.'s online store, http://store.apple.com/1-800-MY-
APPLE/WebObjects/AppleStore (last visited April 14, 2008).
242 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 19.
243 See id at 22 (noting that patients and doctors can request specific
anesthesiologists).
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service provider. 244  For the Seventh Circuit's per se tying
arrangement analysis, mobile handsets and cellular service are two
distinct products.
Furthermore, a tying arrangement plainly exists between sales
of AT&T's cellular service and Apple's iPhone. For a tying
arrangement to exist, the seller must have created conditions in which
a consumer cannot purchase Item A without purchasing Item B as
well. 245 For iPhone sales in AT&T stores, this agreement is express
because consumers cannot purchase the iPhone from that location
246
without signing a two-year contract with AT&T. However, a tying
247
arrangement can exist implicitly as well. Even when consumers
buy an iPhone without visiting an AT&T store, they cannot use any
of its features without activating the product, and they cannot activate
the product unless they sign a two-year contract with AT&T.248
Because AT&T has created a system in which the iPhone cannot
function without activation and activation can only be obtained by
purchasing AT&T cellular service rather than any competitor's
service, the company has tied the two products together. 249
B. AT&T Derives Economic Benefit From the Sale of the
iPhone
To find a tying arrangement per se unlawful, the Seventh
Circuit requires that the tying firm gain some economic benefit from
sales of the tied products. 250 AT&T derives economic benefit from
the sale of both Apple's iPhone and the sale of its cellular service
plan. First, AT&T does not subsidize the cost of the iPhone. Instead,
AT&T pockets roughly ten percent of the revenue from sales of the
244 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 463 (consumer's view of the products
shapes whether they are distinct or the same).
245 Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 567 F.2d at 708.
246 See Apple, Inc., Rate Plans for iPhone, http://www.apple.com/iphone/
easysetup/rateplans.html (last viewed April 14, 2008).
247 See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 325-26.
248 Apple, Inc., Rate Plans for iPhone, http://www.apple.com/
iphone/easysetup/rateplans.html (last viewed April 14, 2008) ("Minimum new 2-
year wireless service plan and activation fee required to activate iPhone features,
including iPod; plans are subject to AT&T credit approval.").
249 See supra notes 177 - 179 and accompanying text.
250 Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co., 585 F.2d at 835.
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iPhone hardware from its retail locations and its online store.251
Furthermore, the exclusivity of the iPhone has affected AT&T's
bottom line. Apple released the iPhone during the third quarter of
AT&T's 2007 fiscal year. During that quarter, AT&T's wireless
subscriptions grew 47 percent over the same quarter in 2006, and the
company added approximately two million subscribers.252 AT&T's
market share increased during the third quarter of 2007 even though
an estimated four out of five Americans already had some form of
253cellular service. Furthermore, AT&T activated 1.1 million
iPhones, 40 percent of which belonged to subscribers who were new
to AT&T's service.254
Apple also has an economic interest in the tying arrangement.
The agreement between Apple and AT&T allowed Apple to get its
foot into the door of the competitive cell phone market and saved the
company money by requiring AT&T to sink millions into developing
a "visual voice mail" system.255 Apple also makes an $80 profit for
every iPhone sold. Finally, Apple takes an estimated $10 per
month from every AT&T iPhone subscriber's contract, providing an
estimated $240 profit from the two-year contract signed to activate
257the iPhone. Each firm generates intertwined revenue from the saleof each product.
C. AT&T Probably Lacks the Market Power to Impose a Tie
Upon Consumers
Whereas the first two prongs are fairly clear cut, the question
of whether AT&T has sufficient economic power to appreciably
restrain competition in the market is less clear. 258 In theory, AT&T
could have market power because it controls a unique product that
251 Vogelstein, supra note 18, at 1.
252 Laurie J. Flynn, AT&T Profit Surges 41% With Help From iPhone, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/
business/24phone.html.
253 Id.
254 id.
255 Vogelstein, supra note 18, at 1.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See Reifert, 450 F.3d at 316.
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other firms cannot sell due to its exclusivity contract. 259 In the past,
the fact that AT&T exercised control over a patented product would
dispose of the issue. 260 Before 2006, courts could infer sufficient
market power based on control over a patented product on the theory
that a patent proved that the item was unique. 26  Many of the
iPhone's components are patented, and Apple has the exclusive right
to produce the iPhone. By logical extension, AT&T's locking
arrangement and five-year exclusivity contract gives it functional
control over the product.262
However, a mobile handset is not unique in the way a film is
unique; it is possible for a consumer to have the functional equivalent
of an iPhone in a way that a consumer cannot obtain the functional
equivalent of Casablanca. In the uniqueness inquiry, a firm must be
unable, not unwilling, to provide the unique product. 263 In theory, a
competitor could not offer products patented by a tying firm, but the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Tool Works signals a clear
willingness to examine functional alternatives in the tying market.
264
Whereas the Court in International Salt did not ask whether
functional equivalents to the Lixator and Saltomat devices existed,
today they might. The iPhone is not the only mobile handset capable
of browsing the internet, providing a keyboard for texting and typing,
playing music, playing movies, or running applications on an
operating system. Other companies are both willing and able to offer
a functional alternative; today, this could make the difference
between per se unlawfulness and a rule of reason analysis.265
Also, AT&T lacks enough market share to have economic
power sufficient to produce the kind of anticompetitive effects the
per se test targets. While AT&T does not need to have a monopoly
market share, it does need to control a sufficient amount of the
market to allow it to raise prices, decrease output, coerce consumers,
259 See Fortner Enter., Inc,. 394 U.S. at 505 (discussing the role of uniqueness
in marketing products).
260 Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 143; Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 45-46.
261 Illinois Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 37.
262 See Vogelstein, supra note 18, at 1.
263 See Blair & Finci, supra note 187, at 541-44.
264 Illinois Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 28.
26' A majority of the Seventh Circuit has indicated that it reads Illinois Tool
Works as a mandate to consider all tying arrangements involving patented products
under a rule of reason analysis. Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 n.2.
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and do anything else that they would not otherwise be able to do in a
competitive market.266 In this case, the tying arrangement affects an
insignificant portion of the general mobile handset market. When the
market is narrowed to smart phone sales in the United States, the
iPhone still only controls twenty-eight percent of the market share by
Apple's best estimates. 267 In Jefferson Parish, a hospital servicing
thirty percent of the population of a county in New Orleans lacked
sufficient market share;268 the result is similar here. Just as seventy
percent of hospital patients could and did seek services elsewhere,
at least seventy percent of American smart phone customers use
different products. Under current "market power" analysis in the
Seventh Circuit, AT&T lacks the market power to produce sufficient
anticompetitive effects to trigger per se unlawfulness.
D. The Tying Arrangement Affects an Insubstantial Amount
of Commerce
Even assuming the Seventh Circuit found market power in the
arrangement, it is doubtful that the arrangement would affect the "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce required under the per se
analysis. 27 First, the Seventh Circuit asks whether there is more than
one competitor in the market for the tied good.271 Given the number
of cellular service providers that offer smart phones, the answer to
this question is obvious. Because various providers offer similar
plans for voice and data transmission over a network, the various
cellular service providers all offer goods and services that are
reasonably interchangeable with one another;272 as such, they fit the
Seventh Circuit's definition of "good substitutes.' 273
The likelihood that the tying arrangement has the potential to
affect a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce depends on the way
the court defines type of product sold and the market in which it is
266 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
267 Guglielmo, supra note 71.
268 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 26-27.
269 id.
270 See Reifert, 450 F.3d at 316.
271 Id. at 318.
272 See id.
273 Id. at 318; see also Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325.
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sold.274 It is possible that the court will define the relevant market as
the mobile handset market generally. If so, and if Apple meets its
goal of shipping ten million iPhones worldwide by the end of 2008,
then the tying arrangement will still affect less than one percent of the
mobile handset market share.27 5 Under this analysis, the amount of
commerce the tying arrangement affects would not be substantial.
However, the Seventh Circuit could find that the tying
arrangement affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the
smart phone market. By defining the goods involved as smart phones
and defining the market as the national rather than global market, the
Seventh Circuit would have to deal with an arrangement that has
taken up twenty-eightpercent of the smart phone market share in
fewer than two years. 2 -T At the very least, this translates to several
million separate iPhone sales tied to contracts for cell phone service
each year. Because federal courts determine the substantiality of the
commerce based on sales volume, 277 this could tip the scales against
the legality of the tying arrangement. In Northern Pacific Railway,
for example, the Supreme Court found that a railroad company
affected a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce because it created
numerous contracts involving millions of acres of land.278 A contract
for the sale of a phone and cellular service might not be given the
same import as a contract for the sale of land, though; a contract for
the sale of land involves a unique item that costs considerably more
than a phone and could involve a certain level of negotiation, whereas
the AT&T terms of service are boilerplate and the price is non-
negotiable. 279 Analyzing the amount of commerce affected in the
narrower smartphone market may lead a court to conclude that the
arrangement affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce, but
such an outcome is far from certain.
274 See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 327.
275 See Wendy Kaufman, Apple Stock Gets Boost From iPhone Hype, NPR,
June 18, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyld=l 1151839.
276 See Guglielmo, supra note 71.
277 Eastman Kodak Co,. 504 U.S. at 462.
278 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 7-8.
279 See Apple Inc.'s Website and the iPhone's terms of service,
http://www.apple.com/legal/iphone/us/terms/service-att.html (last viewed April 14,
2008).
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VI. Conclusion
At present, tying arrangements involving the smartphone
market, much like tying arrangements involving the mobile handset
market in general, lack the ability to produce the anticompetitive
effects that the Sherman Act and Clayton Act were created to
address. While the iPhone's business arrangement may prove
detrimental to consumers in the long run, antitrust laws ultimately
focus on competition, not consumers. No matter the harm to
individual customers, AT&T's deal with Apple presently lacks the
ability to harm competitors. Even if AT&T has the power to make
consumers jump through hoops to get the exact model of smartphone
they want, the company lacks the ability to prevent competitors from
offering an equivalent phone on similar or better terms. The analysis
might change if the iPhone's market share continues its rapid ascent,
but at the moment no cellular service provider has sufficient
economic power to harm its competitors with a tying arrangement.
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